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BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS/NEEDS: Some Problems of Categorical
Translation and Unification.
By Reginald Herbold Green
On a cloth untrue,
With a twisted cue,
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
We who are only undefeated 
Because we have gone on trying.
- T. S. Eliot.
Semantics or Substance
To choose to write on basic human rights from the entry 
point of categories may seem either grimly fatalistic or 
aridly pedantic. If the reductionist structuralist case 
is correct^linguistic study will indeed throw light 
on the realities of the debate but also on its predetermined 
inability to alter conceptual or external reality to alter 
conceptual or external reality. At the opposite extreme 
if one believes sustained attention to definition is a 
barrier to (or an excuse for not) getting down to substance^ 
then yet another exercise in categorisation is at best 
banal and at worst noxious.
However, there is an intermediate position - language 
influences perceptions of what is being discussed but 
is largely subject to control by the discussants. If 
that is so, human rights categories do need critical review.
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At present they tend to divide various 'types1 of 
rights from each other and rights from needs or duties 
in ways which often seem ideally designed to create 
conflict among those who are basically on the same side.
It is quite reasonable that some individuals and groups
should have the greatest concern and expertise with
the right to freedom of expression and others with the
right to eat (or, to translate, the need to communicate freely
and the need to have food). What is neither reasonable
nor necessary is that these differences in personal/
institutional expertise and concern become through
existing categorisation transmuted into divisions preventing
coherent, combined action against 'principalities
and powers' which recognise neither right and perceive their
self interest in frustrating each need.
Individual, Social and Communal rights
It is often suggested that the traditional civil liberties 
are individual rights and the social and economic rights are 
communal or social. On examination this division disintegrates.
The right to freedom of expression to go very far requires 
the right to act in groups to communicate (indeed any 
communication requires a group of at least two). One 
outcome - not an unusual one - of the right to communicate and 
to organise is the claim for autonomy or sovereignty which 
|s exercisable only through rather large social groups.
On the other hand the right to eat is hardly self evidently
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communal as opposed to individual. Human beings as well 
as communities of human beings are hungry - human beings 
(rarely whole communities) starve. Action may well need 
to be social and communal if the right to eat is to 
be made effective?but that is just as true for the more 
traditional civil liberties.
Positive or Negative?
The positive vs negative division is surely a presentational 
one. Freedom of personal security and dignity can 
be expressed as freedom from torture, arbitrary arrest, 
etc. The right to pure water can be expressed as freedom 
from lack of water or polluted water.
In general the negative formulations are used to attack 
a particular existing reality. They are more specific 
and have sharper cutting edges for that purpose. The 
positive formulations are more often used to set out 
goals, test programmes, set as a yardstick to measure 
change. They can be more inclusive and more effective 
in organising for construction (or reconstruction if 
they follow more precise negative formulations cased 
in a struggle to overcome a previous order which made 
positive construction impossible without prior 'demolition 
and removal' operations).
Costless versus Costly?
It is sometimes argued that traditional civil liberties are
4costless and economic/'social rights costly. This is 
surely a rather startling proposition from the point of 
view of states - including ones whose leadership is 
committed to increasing basic human rights.
One cannot convince a dictatorial government that the 
right to criticise and the right to organise will be 
costless to it. More critical, a government facing 
real, externally fomented and backed subversion 
which does entail high costs and real dangers to the 
survival of the state will also view the 'costless1 
line of argument with not wholly unwarranted reserve.
Further to render the right.to communicate effective - 
even by wall newspapers, local print shops, access to 
radio time and radios - takes real resources. A right to 
communicate when there are virtually no channels beyond 
word of mouth is not much more effectual than a right 
to pure water which in practice amounts to digging one's 
own well. Making any basic human right effective has real 
costs and - with a very few exceptions - real costs to 
individuals and communities who are beneficiaries of more 
human rights, not simply those who benefit from restricting 
them. *
Sequential or Interacting?
The argument that traditional civil liberties can be 
established immediately but that economic and social 
rights must come over time is a variant of the cost
categorisation. Some rights can be, in resource terms, and 
should be, in moral terms, established immediately. Examples 
are freedom from torture and freedom from starvation. Not 
lack of resources but entrenched ignorance, apathy and 
evil are the barriers to implementing such rights now.
However, each of these is in fact a first step toward 
a fuller right - to personal security and dignity, to 
an adequate diet which can only be achieved over time and 
which do raise severe resource allocation and technical/ 
institutional obstacles to be overcome. In general 
the progress toward one right both depends on progress 
toward certain others and makes progress toward other 
rights easier. For example, pure water and health 
interlock with each other and with the production side 
of an adequate diet. That whole cluster require 
(or at least are strengthened by) progress toward 
effective rights to participate in decision taking 
and in self organisation to implement decisions.
Therefore, a sequential view of the road toward basic 
human rights is at best partial. While what can be 
achieved now is a contextural question limited by 
time and place, the general approach is interactive. 
Destruction of one right usually leads to erosion 
of others; strengthening of one can lead to greater 
effectiveness of and opportunities for strengthening 
others.
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Basic Human Rights or Needs?
A peculiarly counterproductive debate has arisen over 
whether basic human requirements which any decent society 
has an obligation to supply, any decent human being a duty 
to cooperate in achieving any decent state an obligation 
to respect/promote should be termed rights or needs.
Assuming need is reasonably strictly defined (not 
as equivalent to desire or wish) a basic human need 
logically gives rise to a right (need for food/right to an 
adequate diet) and vice versa (right to freedom of 
expression/need to participate in decision taking).
The debate seems to have arisen for four reasons:
(a) the basic human needs formulations sprang largely 
from Third World Development thinking and practice 
and were not directly addressed to defining rights.
(b) their standard five categories of needs: to a 
minimum, socially defined standard of personal 
consumption; to access to basic communal (public) 
services; to employment productive enough and 
fairly remunerated enough to allow purchase of 
the personal consumption needs; to effective 
participation in decision taking and execution; to 
have a social and economic structure at society
level capable of meeting the four prior categories is - 
at first glance - 'biased' toward social and economic 
needs/rights. However, it is quite practicable to 
articulate all of the traditional civil liberties
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from it and quite unrealistic not to see its inbuilt 
normative structure.
(c) the World Employment Conference formulation concentrated 
on the first three sets of needs (the last two had only 
passing reference) and the Basic Needs (human dropped) 
approach in some variants is almost totally technocratic 
and subject to distortion into 'Bread and Circuses',
'Price and Basketball Courts' or 'Black Beans and Football 
Stadia.'
(d) advocates of traditional civil liberties have sometimes 
been rather slow to see the need to view economic rights as 
essential to human beings and also as necessary (parallel) 
conditions for achieving effective civil liberties.
This set of misperceptions is dangerous. There are differences 
in visions of how rights interact and of emphasis in the 
initial steps toward advancing them. But Basic Human Needs 
and Basic Human Rights advocates are basically on the same 
side and their tendency to suspect serious divisions plays 
into the hands of those who reject that side whether formulated 
in terms of rights or of needs. As to the dangers of distortion 
and misappropriation these are common to almost all worthwhile 
formulations or programmes - the flattery vice pays to virtue.
Rights and Duties
If there is a right there is a duty to implement it. For 
example, if there is a right to fair wages or a just price, there 
is a duty to pay the one and to charge the other. Why, then,
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the problem most advocates of rights (including the author) 
have with formulations which include duties - e.g., the 
interesting (and hopefully influential) Organisation 
of African Unity Draft Charter of Human and People's 
Rights?
The answer is not hard to find. Duties are usually 
defined by a state and are very frequently so defined and 
enforced as to deny basic human rights. However, 
that does not solve the problem that an effective right 
(or need) of a human being (whether individually or 
communally) must impose duties on other human beings, 
social groups and states to respect and to implement it.
For example, the right to freedom from torture imposes a 
duty on the state not to torture and to take action 
against torturers (whether in the public or private 
sectors., at least logically including wife and child beaters 
and the hired 'enforcers' of unjust landlords, 
employers and lenders).
One approach is to ground the justification for duties 
squarely on basic human rights^ and therefore as duties 
a state, a social group or an individual owes to other 
human beings. The duty may be through or enforced by the 
statej but it is not to the state as a subject with 
rights other than those pertaining to and flowing from 
the individual and communal rights of human beings.
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A slightly different position can be argued for 
internationally. If there is a right to 'just 
prices' and/or 'resource transfers' by the people of 
peripheral economies and a duty on the people of 
industrial economies to negotiate/provide them, the 
right and duty must in practice be effected between 
states. Similarly, fair business practice, consumer 
protection, renegotiation of oppressive contracts and 
disclosure are fairly well established as rights in some 
industrial capitalist economies. Internationally they 
are enforceable only if each state has the accepted right 
to enact such statutes and the duty to cooperate in the 
enforcement of those of other states. Without this,
Third World states cannot assert any such rights on 
behalf of their citizens because in these areas the 
heme governments' normal attitude to their TNCs is 
'my citizen, right or wrong, is to be protected1 even 
when the conduct challenged would be patently 
unlawful and likely to be acted against if committed 
at home.
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Enforceability and Morality.
The concept of a human right or a human need is ultimately 
founded on a view of human nature and usually on a 
normative judgment. One can go a surprisingly long 
way in justifying basic human rights on a progmatic 
level, e.g., Milton's Aeropagitica, the ILO's Employment, 
Growth and Basic Needs, t he Brandt Report. To do so may - 
or may not - gain adherents who do not accept a normative 
case or accept it in principle but are worried about its 
cost in practice. But any such case is founded on an 
underlying view of human and of social nature and 
most - including the three cited - probably flow from 
their author's convictions about what is right as 
well as about what 'will work.'
But a normative basis is not, in itself, enough to 
make a right effective. Enforceability - at least in 
substantial measure - and enforceability in practice as 
well as in principle^ is necessary for that. Evidentally 
law and laws are - or can be - major instruments of 
enforcement and should be accessible for such use to 
individuals and groups as well as to the state. But 
actual existing laws are rarely enough. Laws and even 
the main body of the law may well be integral obstacles 
to achieving basic human rights (e.g., in the Republic 
of South Africa) or serious secondary obstacles because they 
have become fossilised in ways which simply do not 
correspond with concepts of rights which do have widespread
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individual and state acceptance but no legal locus standi 
(e.g., in some respects, Tanzania).
Therefore, enforceability is a broader topic than human 
rights law. Use of existing law is one means and 
law reform another; but extralegal (social and communal) 
methods and illegal (including armed violence) are at 
times necessary.
Conflicts and Tradeoffs.
It is unwise to deny that there are ever conflicts 
among basic human rights at the level of progress toward 
their attainment in a given setting at a given time. To 
take that extreme a position is all too often a way to be 
pushed into defending 'freedom of speech with starvation' 
or 'freedom from hunger with dictatorship'. That usually 
is a false set of choices. For example,-if there were 
freedom of expression and organisation in the Philippines, 
could there have been a breakthrough in food production 
(and into food exports) by mechanisms which also increased 
hunger and clinical malnutrition? Denial of a civil 
liberty and of an economic right are in this case Siamese 
twin s.
But what of a weak but popular state subject to real 
dangers of subversion and destabilisation which has evidence 
to show a 60-40 chance that A, B, C are plotting action 
which?if unchecked^will have high social cost. Does one 
ignore that 'beyond reasonable doubt1 standard in the 
courts? Detain without trial? Allow the action to proceed
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further in hopes of getting better evidence even if, 
a) the likelihood is that innocent bystanders will be 
deprived of the right to life and b) the plot may then 
succeed? There are real abridgements of and risks to 
basic human rights whichever course is adopted.
Further, not all rights widely seen as basic human 
rights are so perceived by majorities in all societies.
In one African state the proponents of the right to
freedom from capital punishment seemed to be: the
President, the Attorney General, one judge, two advisers,
a handful of clerics. It is easy to assert the majority
suffered from 'ignorance' or 'false consciousness' but
less easy to argue that the 'right to life' should
have been enforced, overriding the right to democratic
decision taking in the hopes the law itself would educate
the 99% who would have opposed it. Nor is there agreement
on all contenders for the status of basic human rights.
Abortion, euthenasia, private ownership of the means
of production are candidates for the status of basic
human rights, which equally sincere and by no means
self evidently illogical rights advocates see as basic
human wrongs. In addition, certain rights - e.g., the
right to privacy - while perhaps universal^take such different
forms in varying societies that general formulations
seem well nigh impossible.
Toward a Holistic, Contextual Approach?
The purpose of this exploration of categories has been
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to contend - and hopefully demonstrate - that the full 
range of basic human rights rest on similar needs and 
normative premises, have similar problems of achievement 
and effectiveness and are not merely compatible 
but basically part of a unifying self sustaining whole.
The enemy of one right is usually the enemy of all or most, 
the advocate of one should logically be the advocate 
of all even if his efforts and abilities may quite 
reasonably be focussed on the one.
Equally, however, once one leaves the level of faith 
and proceeds to the level of the works without which 
that faith is dead, very real contextual diversities 
of approach arise. Different degrees of broadening 
(or defending and sustaining) rights are necessary 
and possible. Different interlocks of rights (e.g., right 
to organise and right to eat in much of South and 
Southeast Asia) are of special urgency. A universal set 
of norms and goals does not deny the need for varied 
formulations, still less for varied paths toward 
them, least of all for different emphases and efforts 
by different individuals and groups (e.g, for Amnesty 
and War on Want to duplicate each other's work., 
as opposed to appreciating the common base and the 
overlapping concerns., would hardly advance civil liberties 
or freedom from absolute poverty). In the house of basic 
human rights/needs, also, there are many mansions.
Note
Further torture and failure to follow due process 
may be unrelated to lack of resources to preserve security 
and to have prompt trials. The Indian blindings, 
mutilations and 'undertrial1 prison hordes illustrate 
this. Because people do view security as important 
it is not surprising that there is some genuine 
sympathy with the police. Similarly in Tanzania the 
1976 deaths under interrogation leading to subsequent 
trials for murder of senior police and prisons officers 
came in the context of a wave of 'witchcraft' 
murders in respect to which no hard evidence could be ' 
obtained by proper methods. To maintain the right 
to freedom from torture and also the normal human 
being's right to reasonable security from armed robbers 
and 'witches' does require quite costly pQlice and court 
structures.
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